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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and
photographic analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch,
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In
addition to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video
Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space
Flight Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also
included in this document to provide an integrated assessment
of the mission.
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Shuttle Mission STS-59 was launched at 7:05 a.m. local 4/9/94

1.0 Summary
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 7 April 1994. The detailed walkdown of Launch
Pad 39A and MLP-2 also included the primary flight elements
OV-105 Endeavour (6th flight), ET-63 (LWT 56), and BI-065
SRB's. There were no significant facility or vehicle anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded on 7 April 1994. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside of the
established data base.
The launch was scrubbed at the end of the window while in an
extended hold at T-5 minutes due to an RTLS crosswind violation
at the SLF. A post drain walkdown revealed no flight hardware
or facility anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded a second time on 8 April 1994. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside of the
established data base and no IPR's were taken.
After the 7:05 a.m. launch on 9 April 1994, a debris walkdown
of Pad 39A was performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials
were found. All of the north HDP doghouse blast covers were in
the closed position. However, all four covers, which are
sacrificial, sustained severe erosion with numerous areas of
burn-through.
Post launch inspections revealed significant damage to the GOX
Vent Arm at the axial adjustment attach point. Several welds
were broken and the piston housing had collapsed. This damaged
caused the hood to be skewed or twisted 1-2 inches from the
centerline. Vibration/acoustic shock waves from the SRB plume
and 16 knot winds from the east (105 degrees) at the time of
launch are believed to be related to the failure. Some of the
damage was attributed to improper welds (IFA STS-59-K-01).
A total of 117 films and videos were analyzed as part of the
post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost flight
hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. The
SSME #2 Mach diamond formed prior to SSME #3 during ignition,
but MPS instrumentation showed no anomaly.
Differential deflection between inboard and outboard elevons
during ascent was visible in numerous films. An ascent program/
schedule of elevon deflection for the purpose of load relief is
I-loaded into the Orbiter computer prior to launch. Elevon
actuator feedback based on aerodynamic pressure due to the
actual flight conditions causes deflection deltas to the ascent
schedule. These deflections are small in magnitude. The flight
deltas to the STS-59 ascent schedule were normal.
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On-orbit photography revealed no major vehicle damage or lost
flight hardware that would have been a safety-of-flight
concern. Six divots, ranging in size from 6 to I0 inches in
diameter, occurred in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout
in the +Y+Z quadrant (2 places outboard of the L02 feedline),
-Y+Z quadrant (3 places between the -Y bipod and the -Y thrust
panel), and on the outboard bondline of the -Y bipod spindle
housing closeout. A divot, 8 inches in diameter, occurred in
the LH2 tank acreage just aft of the LH2 tank-to-intertank
flange closeout near the -Y bipod. A dark area in the divot may
be shadow or primer. Both bipod jack pad closeouts were intact
and appeared to be in excellent condition.
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after
retrieval. Both frustums had a combined total of 46 MSA-2
debonds over fasteners. A debris impact site was noted on the
right IEA forward surface TPS at 145 degrees radial location
(IFA STS-59-I-02). The impact cavity measured 2" x 1.5" x
1.75". The foam in the damage site was crushed and showed signs
that heating had occurred inside the cavity possibly during
ascent. No debris object or foreign substance was found. Post
flight analysis at MSFC revealed no residual material in the
cavity. The impact damage was most likely caused by a piece of
ice from the ET L02 feedline upper bellows.
K5NA had separated from Hypalon-covered BTA and primer-coated
metal on the BSM support brackets (IFA STS-59-B-01). Current
surface preparation procedures are inadequate for proper K5NA
adhesion. The closeouts on STS-65 were reworked and changes to
the procedure have been incorporated.
A post landing inspection of OV-105 was conducted on the runway
at DFRF. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 77 hits, of which
19 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The Orbiter
lower surface had a total of 47 hits, of which 10 had a major
dimension of one inch or greater. Based on these numbers and
comparison to statistics from previous missions of similar
configuration, both the total number of debris hits and the
number of hits 1-inch or larger was less than average.
The crew hatch outer pane (window #II) sustained an apparent
micrometeorite impact. The damage site measure I/4-inch in
diameter and was located at the 7 o'clock position of the
window, one inch from the edge tiles.
ET/ORB separation devices EO-I and EO-3 functioned properly
though the EO-2 debris plunger had not seated. No debris was
found on the runway beneath the ET/ORB umbilical cavities when
the ET doors were opened, but a loose wave sprint was found
resting against a Hi-Lock fastener on the LH2 umbilical door.
The wave spring is part of the pyro separation device. All of
the umbilical separation ordnance' retention shutters were
closed properly.
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Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a
variety of residuals in the Orbiter window samples from the
window protective covers, SRB BSM exhaust, Orbiter TPS, RCS
thruster paper covers, and paints/primers from various sources.
The residual sampling data do not indicate a single source of
damaging debris as all of the materials have previously been
documented in post-landing sample reports. The residual sample
data showed no debris trends when compared to previous mission
data.
A total of ten Post Launch Anomalies, including three In-Flight
Anomalies, were observed during the STS-59 mission assessment.
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2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Ice/Debris/TPS/Photographic Analysis Team briefing for
launch activities was conducted on 7 April 1994 at 0800 hours.
These personnel participated in various team activities,
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and
contributed to reports contained in this document.
G. Katnik
B. Davis
P. Rosado
R. Speece
B. Bowen
K. Tenbusch
J. Rivera
M. Bassignani
A. Oliu
J. Blue
J. Kercsmar
G. Fales
M. Jaime
Z. Byrns
J. Stone
W. Atkinson
S. Clark
J. Cook
S. Otto
A. Howard
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
LSOC - SPC
LSOC - SPC
LSOC - SPC
LSOC - SPC
NASA - KSC
RI - DNY
RI - LSS
RI - LSS
MTI - LSS
MMMSS- LSS
LSOC - SPC
Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
Debris, IR, Photo Analysis
Chief, ET Mechanical Systems
Lead, Thermal Protection Sys
ET Processing/Ice/Debris/TPS
ET Processing/Ice/Debris/TPS
Lead, ET Structures
ET Processing, Ice/Debris
ET Processing, Ice/Debris
ET Processing
ET Processing
ET Processing
ET Processing
Level II Integration
Debris Assess, LVL II Integ
GS Integration
System Integration
SRM Processing
ET Processing
Safety
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3.0 SCRUB - RTLS CROSSWIND VIOLATION
The first launch attempt of STS-59 was scrubbed at the end of
the window while in an extended hold at T-5 minutes due to an
RTLS cross wind violation at the SLF.
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 7 April 1994 from 0900-1030 hours. The
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39A and MLP-2 also included the
primary flight elements 0V-105 Endeavour (6th flight), ET-63
(LWT 56), and BI-065 SRB's. There were no significant debris
issues or vehicle anomalies.
3.2 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 8 April 1994 from 0220 to 0400 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established
data base and no IPR's were taken. Ambient weather conditions
at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
71.7 Degrees F
70.5 Percent
15.5 Knots
026 Degrees
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to obtain
vehicle surface temperature measurements (ref Figures 1 and 2)
for a thermal assessment of the vehicle
3.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter RCC panel or TPS anomalies were observed. All RCS
thruster paper covers were intact though the cover on thruster
L3D was wet. Typical ice and frost accumulations were present
at the SSME heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. The base heat
shield tiles were dry. An infrared scan revealed readings in
the low 30's on SSME #2 engine mounted heat shield. There were
no unusual temperature gradients on the base heat shield or
engine mounted heat shields.
3.4 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH SRB case
temperatures of 72-75 degrees F. In comparison, temperatures
measured by a hand-held Minolta Cyclops spot radiometer were
72-74 degrees F and the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation
(GEI) measured temperatures of 70-75 degrees F. All measured
temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement.
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The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied
by MTI was 71 degrees F, which was within the required range of
44-86 degrees F. No access was available to view the TPS on the
RH SRB ETA ring forward surface.
3.5 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run
from 2300 to 1030 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3.
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
Light condensate, but no ice/frost accumulation, was observed
by the Ice Team on the L02 tank. There were no TPS anomalies.
The portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 66
degrees F on the ogive and 63 degrees F on the barrel section.
In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures
that averaged 66 degrees F on the ogive and 64 degrees F on
the barrel; SURFICE predicted temperatures of 62 degrees F on
the ogive and 59 degrees F on the barrel.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Typical
ice/frost accumulations and no unusual vapors were present on
the ET umbilical carrier plate. The portable STI measured a
surface temperature of 71 degrees F.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Very light
condensate, but no ice/frost, was present on the acreage. The
portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 62
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 65 degrees F on the lower
LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured
temperatures that averaged 61 degrees F on the upper and 64
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank, respectively; SURFICE
predicted temperatures of 59 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank
and 60 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank.
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. A
crack, 8-inches long by i/4-inch wide, was present in the -Y
vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS near the longeron
closeout interface. The crack, which exhibited no offset and
was not filled with ice or frost, was located approximately 4
inches farther in the +Z direction from the area where similar
cracks had appeared on previous tanks.
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline
bellows and support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. There
were light accumulations of ice/frost on the umbilical purge
barrier. Ice/ frost fingers on the separation bolt pyrotechnic
canister purge vents were typical.
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Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both
burst disks was typical. Condensate covered the LH2 feedline
bellows.
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB
umbilical top and outboard sides. Typical ice/frost fingers had
formed on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents. Two
2-inch diameter frost spots were present on the umbilical
between the recirculation line and aft pyro canister closeout.
There were no unusual vapors or cryogenic drips during tanking
and stable replenish.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which
were acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria,
consisted of one OTV recorded item:
Anomaly 001 documented a crack, 8-inches long by I/4-inch wide,
in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS. The
crack exhibited no offset and was not filled with ice or frost.
3.6 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch (LCC requirement). There was no
debris on the MLP deck or in the SRB holddown post areas with
the exception of a gray-painted i" x 1/4" diameter bolt found
on the MLP deck west of the LH SRB under the retraction path of
the Orbiter Weather Protection (OWP). Similar bolts are used in
the OWP sheet metal.
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals, the GH2 vent line, or the GUCP.
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All RCS thruster paper covers were intact though the cover
on the L3D thruster was wet from an internal vapor leak
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Pre-launch view of bipod jack pad closeouts
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A crack 8 inches long by 1/4 inch wide appeared in the forward
surface of the -Y ET/SRB cable tray after cryoload. The crack
was not filled with ice or frost and exhibited no offset. The
condition was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria
15
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3.7 POST DRAIN VEHICLE INSPECTION
A post drain inspection was performed from 1600 to 1700 hours
on 8 April 1994. This inspection also satisfied the requirement
for a pre-launch SSV/pad debris walkdown approximately 24 hours
prior to launch.
The tumble valve cover on the External Tank was intact. No
defects were noted on the nosecone TPS -Y side.
No anomalies (divots or cracks) were observed on the L02 tank,
intertank, or LH2 tank acreage.
Ice remained in the L02 feedline support brackets, but no loose
foam or TPS damage was visible.
Bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with adjacent
LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout foam.
The crack in the -Y ET/SRB vertical strut cable tray forward
surface TPS (reported during the Ice Team Inspection) was still
visible.
No anomalies were observed on the Orbiter, Solid Rocket
Boosters, or MLP deck. No access was available to view the TPS
on the RH SRB ETA ring forward surface.
No problems or corrective actions requiring resolution prior to
the next cryoload were identified as a result of the post drain
inspection.
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Post drain inspection revealed no problems requiring cor[ective
action prior to the next cryoload. The tumble valve cover _ was
intact. No defects were observed on the nose cone TPS.
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4.0 LAUNCH
STS-59 was launched at 94:099:11:05:00.020 GMT (7:05 am local)
on 9 April 1994.
4.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A post drain walkdown was performed after the scrub on 8 April
1994. This inspection also satisfied the requirement for a
pre-launch SSV/pad debris walkdown approximately 24 hours prior
to launch.
4.2 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 9 April 1994 from 0200 to 0315 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established
data base and no IPR's were taken. Ambient weather conditions
at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
71.6 Degrees F
85.1 Percent
11.7 Knots
012 Degrees
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
as shown in Figures 4 and 5.
4.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS
thruster paper covers, including the wet covers on the L3D and
L4L nozzles, were intact. Typical ice/frost accumulations were
present at the SSME #I and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces.
An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on
the base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields.
4.4 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the PSTI ranged from 70 to 74
degrees F. The Minolta spot radiometer was not used for this
launch attempt. The SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation
(GEI) measured temperatures between 70-77 degrees F. All
measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum
requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature
(PMBT) supplied by MTI was 71 degrees F, which was within the
required range of 44-86 degrees F. No access was available to
view the TPS on the RH SRB ETA ring forward surface.
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4.5 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE" was run
from 2300 to 0705 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 6.
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
The Ice Team observed no ice/frost accumulations on the L02
tank though light condensate was present on the L02 tank ogive
and barrel sections. There were no TPS anomalies. The portable
STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 63 degrees F on
the ogive and 60 degrees F on the barrel section. The Minolta
Cyclops radiometer was not used for this launch attempt.
SURFICE predicted temperatures of 63 degrees F on the ogive and
60 degrees F on the barrel.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Typical
ice/frost accumulation, but no unusual vapor, was present on
the ET umbilical carrier plate. The portable STI measured an
average surface temperature of 71 degrees F on the intertank.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Condensate, but
no ice or frost, was present on the acreage. The portable STI
measured surface temperatures that averaged 61 degrees F on the
upper LH2 tank and 64 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. SURFICE
predicted temperatures of 58 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank
and 62 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank.
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts.
The 8" x 1/4" crack in the -Y ET/SRB cable tray TPS, previously
reported during the first cryoload, had not changed. The
presence of the crack was acceptable for flight.
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline
bellows and support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/
frost fingers on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge
vents were typical.
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with
condensate.
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB
umbilical purge barrier top and outboard sides. Typical ice/
frost fingers had formed on the pyro canister and plate gap
purge vents. Two 3-inch diameter frost spots were present on
the umbilical between the recirculation line and aft pyro
canister closeout. The 17-inch flapper valve actuator access
port foam plug was properly closed out. No unusual vapors or
cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish,
and launch.
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The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which
were all acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria,
consisted of four OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 documented ice/frost formations on the L02 and LH2
ET/ORB umbilicals, pyro canister purge vents, and cable tray
vent holes.
Anomaly 002 documented ice/frost accumulations on the L02 feed
line support brackets and bellows.
Anomaly 003 documented ice/frost formations in the LH2 feedline
bellows and the LH2 recirculation line bellows and burst disks.
Anomaly 004 documented a crack, 8-inches long by i/4-inch wide,
in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS. The
crack exhibited no offset and was not filled with ice or frost.
4.6 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch (LCC requirement).
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals, the GH2 vent line, or the GUCP.
No ET nosecone/ footprint damage was visible after the GOX vent
hood was retracted.
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A crack 8 inches long by 1/4 inch wide in the forward surface
of the -Y ET/SRB cable tray had not changed since the previous
cryoload. The condition was acceptable for flight per the
NSTS-08303 criteria.
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Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the ET/ORB LH2
umbilical including ice/frost fingers on the plate gap and pyro
can purge vents. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips appeared
during tanking, stable replenish, and launch.
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5.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS, and RSS was
conducted on 9 April 1994 from Launch + 2 to 3.5 hours.
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found.
South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP shoe EPON shim
material was intact. A small portion of sidewall shim material
was debonded from HDP #2. There was no visual indication of a
stud hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. All of the
north HDP doghouse blast covers had closed properly. However,
all four covers, which are sacrificial, sustained severe
erosion with numerous areas of burn-through. The SRB aft skirt
purge lines and T-0 umbilicals exhibited typical exhaust plume
damage.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA), and GOX
vent arm showed only minor damage. However, an ELSA box
container in the White Room detached from the wall spilling the
individual ELSA units on the floor.
The GH2 vent line was latched on the eighth tooth of the
latching mechanism, had no loose cables (static retract
lanyard) and appeared to have latched properly with no rebound.
The crossbeam between the two GUCP legs showed signs of contact
with the lanyard.
Damage to the facility included four shattered lenses and one
loose box inspection cover on the MLP deck cameras. A retaining
pin, 8 inches long by 1.5 inches in diameter, came out from the
northwest MLP crossover and fell to the stairs below. An
aluminum rod, 20 inches long by 3/4 inches in diameter, was
found on the FSS 135 foot level.
Post launch debris inspections of the pad acreage, beach, and
areas outside the pad perimeter were performed. No flight
hardware or TPS material was found.
Subsequent inspections at the pad revealed significant damage
to the GOX Vent Arm at the axial adjustment attach point.
Several welds were broken and the piston housing had collapsed.
This damaged caused the hood to be skewed or twisted
approximately 1-2 inches from centerline (IFA STS-59-K-01).
Vibration/acoustic shock waves from the SRB plume and 16 knot
winds from the east (105 degrees) at the time of launch are
believed to be related to the failure. Some of the damage was
attributed to improper welds.
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section i0.
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South SRB holddown post erosion was typical. All south HDP
shoe EPON shim material was intact.
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All of the north holddown post doghouse blast covers had closed
properly. However, all four covers, which are sacrificial,
sustained severe erosion with numerous areas of burn-through.
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|Typical pre-launch configuration of north SRB holddown post
doghouse blast cover
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6.0 FILM REVIEW AND PROBLEM REPORTS
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the
Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems
engineers. No IPR's or In-Flight Anomalies were generated as a
result of the film review. Post flight anomalies are listed in
Section i0.
6.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 96 films and videos, which included forty-one 16mm
films, twenty-one 35mm films, four 70mm films, and thirty
videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have affected the mission.
Sparks from the hydrogen igniters contacted the LH2 TSM and the
upper surface of the Orbiter inboard elevon (E-31).
SSME gimbal profile appeared normal (OTV 051, 070, 071). The
SSME #i and #2 Mach diamonds formed prior to SSME #3, which
should have been first. MPS instrumentation showed no anomaly
during ignition and flight (E-76). Free burning hydrogen
drifted to the top of the LH2 TSM. A large piece of ice fell
from the LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical cryogenic lines and contacted
SSME #3 near the nozzle exit plane. No damage was visible
(E-15, 19).
Two streaks occurred in the SSME plume during engine startup.
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the
centerline area between the SSME cluster occurred during engine
start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous
launches (E-76, 77).
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice to fall from the
ET/Orbiter umbilicals, some of the ice impacted the umbilical
cavity sill and were deflected outward, but no tile damage was
visible (OTV 009, 063).
A puff of vapor exited the L3D (aft down firing RCS thruster on
the left side) after the nozzle paper cover tore during SSME
startup. This cover had been wetted from the inside prior to
launch - a condition indicative of an internal vapor leak
(E-18).
Surface coating material was lost from base heat shield tiles
outboard of SSME #3 (27 places), on the base heat shield
between SSME #i and #2 (3 places), near SSME #2 (i place), on
the RH ACPS pod aft surface (3 place_), and on the LH ACPS pod
aft surface (i place). Erosion of the tile surface coating was
more than usual (E-17, 18, 19, 20).
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A small piece of ice or foam broke away from the +Y vertical
strut-to-acreage interface during main engine ignition (OTV
O54).
Residual gaseous oxygen exited the ET louvers. The louvers were
covered by frost, but no ice was visible. Some frost fell away
from the louvers after SSME ignition. There was no visible
damage to the nosecone, fairing, louver, or footprint (OTV 013,
061, 063).
The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and
retracted properly (OTV 049, 050).
GUCP disconnect from the External Tank was nominal. The GH2
vent line appeared to latch properly. Some slack in the static
retract lanyard caused the cable to contact the GUCP leg/
crossbeam. Post launch inspection found the GH2 vent line
latched on the eighth tooth of the latching mechanism (E-33,
41, 42, 50, OTV 040).
No stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. No
ordnance fragments or frangible nut pieces fell from any of the
DCS/stud holes.
At approximately 7 seconds MET (after tower clear but prior to
the vehicle roll program), vibration/acoustic shock waves from
the SRB exhaust plume caused significant up/down movement of
the GOX vent arm and twisting of the GOX vent hood. Component
failure on the hood occurred at 8.16 seconds MET (IFA STS-59-
K-01). The time of visible movement corresponded to maximum
strains recorded by GVA strain gages during previous launches.
Amplitude and frequency of the movement was significantly
different when compared to previous launches with similar
easterly winds. Vibration/acoustic shock waves from the SRB
plume and a strong wind from the east (16 knots at 105 degrees)
at the time of launch are believed to be the major contributor
to the hood failure.
A box of emergency breathing units was observed falling to the
floor of the Orbiter Access Arm White Room in this same time
frame. All of the units remained within the confines of the
white room and were not a threat to the vehicle (E-62).
Facility debris was blown westward beneath the RSS by the SRB
exhaust plume (E-63).
A large piece of ice from the outboard side of LH2 ET/ORB
umbilical fell aft and broke into smaller pieces without
contacting the vehicle at 11:05:07 GMT (E-54, 59).
Six pieces of ET/0RB umbilical purge barrier (baggie) material
fell aft of the vehicle just after the roll maneuver starting
at 11:05:17 GMT (E-54, 59, 207, 212, 213, 220, 222, TV-4A).
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Two pieces of aft skirt thermal curtain tape were loose on the
RH SRB (E-207).
All SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield closeout blankets appeared to
be intact and missing no material (E-207).
Very clear views of Orbiter body flap movement showed amplitude
and frequency similar to previous flights (E-207, 212, 213).
Differential deflection between inboard and outboard elevons
during ascent was visible in numerous films (E-207, 212). An
ascent program/schedule of elevon deflection for the purpose of
load relief is I-loaded into the Orbiter computer prior to
launch. Elevon actuator feedback based on aerodynamic pressure
due to the actual flight conditions causes deflection deltas to
the ascent schedule. These deflections are small in magnitude.
The flight deltas to the STS-59 ascent schedule were normal.
Numerous (at least 35) SRB propellant particles fell from the
exhaust plume during ascent at GMT 11:06:05.967, 11:06:07.035,
and 11:06:17.079 (E-208, 220, TV-4A).
Exhaust plume recirculation, ET aft dome charring, and SRB
separation appeared nominal. Numerous pieces of slag dropped
out of the SRB plume before, during, and after separation.
Frustum separation from the forward skirts and parachute
deployment appeared normal. One parachute was late in opening
but reached full reef position before nozzle severance (E-301).
Water splashdown was not visible.
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The SSME #i and #2 Mach diamonds formed prior to SSME #3, which
should have been first. MPS instrumentation showed no anomalies
during ignition and flight.
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Surface coating material was lost from 27 places on base heat
shield tiles near SSME #3. Erosion of the tile surface coating
was more than usual.
34
OPtGI_'.!AL ,_r .,'.,'-i ,'.',_ C
COLO}_ ?HOT O__-IRT.?;-I

A strong easterly wind and vibration/acoustics from the SRB
exhaust plume caused damage to the ET Gaseous Oxygen Vent Hood
and a box of emergency breathing units in the White Room.
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Differential deflection between inboard and outboard elevons
during ascent was visible in numerous films. The deflections,
programmed for flight load relief, were found to be normal.
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6.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO S_Y
DTO-0312 was performed by the flight crew. Thirty-six hand-held
still images were obtained of the ET after separation from the
Orbiter. OV-105 was equipped to carry two umbilical cameras:
16mm motion picture with 10mm lens and 35mm still views.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have been a safety of flight concern. Review of the
on-orbit photography resulted in no IFA candidates.
Six divots, ranging in size from 6 to 10 inches in diameter,
occurred in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout in the
+Y+Z quadrant (2 places outboard of the L02 feedline), -Y+Z
quadrant (3 places between the -Y bipod and the -Y thrust
panel), and on the outboard bondline of the -Y bipod spindle
housing closeout.
A less than usual number of shallow "popcorn" type divots were
visible on the +Z side of the intertank acreage in the vicinity
of the bipods. There were no divots on any of the intertank
stringer heads.
A divot, 8 inches in diameter, occurred in the LH2 tank acreage
just aft of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout near the
-Y bipod. A dark area in the divot may be shadow or primer.
Both bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and appeared to be in
excellent condition.
Four divots, ranging in size from 6 to 12 inches in diameter,
occurred in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout -Z side
in an area between the -Z RSS antenna and the flight door.
A 6-inch diameter divot appeared in the LH2 tank acreage just
below the flange closeout aft of the -Y EB fitting.
The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical TPS appeared to be in good condition
with minimal damage. The red purge seal was intact. Blistering
of the fire barrier coating was typical. Small pieces of foam
were missing or eroded from the horizontal section of the cable
tray and the vertical section of the LH2 feedline support.
Frozen hydrogen adhered to the 17-inch flapper valve.
The LO2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to be in good condition
overall. Numerous divots and eroded areas were visible on the
horizontal and vertical sections of the cable tray. The red
purge seal was intact. All lightning contact strips on the
umbilical appeared to be present and intact.
A greater than usual number of small shallow "popcorn" type
divots occurred on the LH2 tank acreage forward of the
crossbeam.
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SRB separation from the ET and External Tank separation from
the Orbiter were nominal.
The BSM burn scars on the L02 tank barrel were typical. Some-
what more than usual charring from ascent aeroheating occurred
on the nosecone and L02 tank ogive. No anomalies were observed
on the nosecone, L02 tank acreage, PAL ramps, RSS antennae,
flight door, bipod ramps, L02 feedline, and aft hard point.
Typical charring from plume recirculation, but no divots, were
visible on the aft dome acreage. Erosion of the manhole cover
closeouts and aft dome apex was also typical.
38
39
,-4
0
fl]
fl]
flJ
0
O
t_
0
14
t/]
E_
0
,-4
0 0
"_ .,'I
• _
0 _
0 •
-_ .el
m4_
_._I _"
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH

Separation of the External Tank from the Orbiter appeared
normal. Small pieces of foam were missing or eroded from the
horizontal section of the cable tray and the vertical section
of the LH2 feedline support. The red purge seal appeared to be
intact. Frozen hydrogen adhering to the 17-inch flapper valve
was typical.
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The L02 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to be in good condition. A
greater than usual number of shallow "popcorn" type divots
occurred on the LH2 tank acreage forward of the crossbeam.
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The bipod jack pad closeouts were intact. An 8-inch diameter
divot with exposed primer occurred in the LH2 tank acreage near
the left bipod. Six divots were visible in the intertank-to-LH2
tank flange closeout. Note unusual shaped ice in lower corner.
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No anomalies were observed on the nose cone or acreage areas of
the L02 tank, intertank, and LH2 tank (-Y and -Z sides). Nine
divots occurred in the intertank-to-LH2 tank flange closeout
between the left bipod and the -Z RSS antenna.
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6.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUPR4ARY
A total of 18 landing films and videos, including eleven 16mm
high speed films, two 35mm large format films, and five videos,
were reviewed.
Orbiter performance on final approach appeared normal. There
were no anomalies when the landing gear was extended. Touchdown
of the left and right main gear was nominal and virtually
simultaneous.
The drag chute was deployed after breakover, but before the
nose gear contacted the runway. Drag chute deployment appeared
nominal.
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. There were no
anomalies during rollout and wheel stop.
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7.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on II April 1994 from 1130 to
1330 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in good
condition.
7.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 23 MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners (Figure 7). There was virtually no blistering of the
Hypalon paint with the exception of minor localized blistering
along the 395 ring. All BSM aero heat shield covers had locked
in the fully opened position though the upper right cover
attach ring had been bent by parachute riser entanglement.
The RH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing
TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact,
though the +Z antenna base plate had delaminated. PR-1422
adhesive was missing from one RSS antenna bolt head. Minor
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the ET/SRB attach
point and on the systems tunnel cover. No pins were missing
from the frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were
generally in good condition. Trailing edge damage to the FJPS
and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers appeared undamaged. A
debris impact site was noted on the IEA forward surface TPS at
145 degrees radial location (IFA STS-59-I-02). The impact
cavity measured 2" x 1.5" x 1.75" The foam in the damage site
was crushed and showed signs that heating had occurred inside
the cavity possibly during ascent. No debris object or foreign
substance was found. Post flight analysis at MSFC revealed no
residual material in the cavity. The impact damage was most
likely caused by a piece of ice from the ET LO2 feedline upper
bellows. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts
were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. Aft
skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition. K5NA had
separated from Hypalon-covered BTA and primer-coated metal on
the BSM support brackets (IFA STS-59-B-01). Current surface
preparation procedures are inadequate for proper K5NA adhesion.
The closeouts on STS-65 were reworked and the procedure changed
The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated
and appeared to have functioned properly. EPON shim material is
no longer bonded to the HDP #3 and #4 aft skirt structure.
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IThe RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 23 MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners. Blistering of the Hypalon paint was minimal. The BSM
aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position
47
ORIGINAL PAGE
COLOR PHO, O_,,t-q.,H

RH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing TPS.
Blistering of the Hypalon paint was minimal.
48
_T

Both RSS a_tennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact,
lh{_11c[h f-he -t,< antenna base p]at_ had delaminalTe<|.
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A debris impact site was noted on the right IEA forward surface
TPS at 145 degrees radial location. The foam in the damage site
was crushed and showed signs that heating had occurred inside
the cavity. No debris object or foreign residue was found.
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7.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 17 MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners and 6 debonds over acreage (Figure 8). Significant
amounts of BTA had been applied to closeouts on this frustum.
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where the
BTA had been applied. The underlying BTA was not sooted. All
BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened
position.
The LH forward skirt acreage exhibited no missing TPS though
two debonded areas occurred between the flight door and the
ET/SRB attach point. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base
plates were intact. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint
occurred near the ET/SRB attach point and on the systems tunnel
cover. No pins were missing from the frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good
condition. In general, minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS
and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, IEA covers, and stiffener rings
appeared undamaged. The stiffener ring splice plate closeouts
were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. Aft
skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition (Figure 9).
Two by two inch pieces of MSA-2 were missing from fasteners
near the hydrazine servicing ports (3 places) and on the 1860
ring frame near the +Y axis (i place). Hypalon paint was
blistered over areas where BTA had been applied. The underlying
BTA was generally not sooted.
K5NA had separated from Hypalon-covered BTA and primer-coated
metal on the BSM support brackets (IFA STS-59-B-01). Current
surface preparation procedures are inadequate for proper K5NA
adhesion. The closeouts on STS-65 were reworked and changes to
the procedure were incorporated.
Three of four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were
seated and appeared to have functioned properly. The HDP #6 DCS
plunger was obstructed by frangible nut debris. Disassembly of
the DCS revealed a retention of 96 percent. EPON shim material
is no longer bonded to the HDP #7 and #8 aft skirt structure.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section i0.
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iThe LH frustum had a total of 17 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners
and 6 acreage debonds. Significant amounts of BTA had been
applied as a closeout material on this frustum.
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Hypalon paint was blistered and/or missing from areas where
had been applied. The underlying BTA was not sooted.
BTA
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The LH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 exhibited no missing TPS
though two debonded areas occurred between the flight door and
the ET/SRB attach point. Both RSS antenna covers/phenolic base
plates were intact.
57

$8

Two by two inch pieces of MSA-2 were missing from fasteners
near the hydrazine service ports. Hypalon paint was blistered/
missing from BTA closeout areas.
59

HDP #_ DCS plunger was obstructed by fran(]ible nut debris
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8.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing debris inspection of or-105 (Endeavour) was
conducted 20-21 April 1994 at the Dryden Flight Research Center
(DFRF) on runway 22 and in the Mate/Demate Device (MDD). This
inspection was performed to identify debris impact damage and,
if possible, debris sources. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total
of 77 hits, of which 19 had a major dimension of one inch or
larger. This total does not include the numerous hits on the
base heat shield attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics and
exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to
statistics from 46 previous missions of similar configuration
(excluding missions STS-23, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42,
which had damage from known debris sources), indicates both the
total number of hits and the number of hits 1-inch or larger
was less than average (Figures 10-13).
The following table breaks down the STS-59 Orbiter debris
damage by area:
Lower surface
Upper surface
Right side
Left side
Right OMS Pod
Left OMS Pod
10 47
8 18
0 2
0 0
1 9
0 1
TOTALS 19 77
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 47 hits, of
which 10 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger. A total of
16 hits, in two clusters of eight hits, occurred just aft of
the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. Three of these damage sites had a
major dimension larger than 1-inch. Clusters of hits around the
L02 and LH2 ET/ORB umbilicals are believed to be impacts from
umbilical ice.
The inboard tires on both the left and right main landing gear
sustained significant wear-type damage on the inboard portions.
Numerous pieces of tread were found on the runway following
landing. Although none of the tire tread debris was found in
the tile damage sites, some of the lower surface debris damage
aft of the main landing gear may be attributable to the tire
debris.
The crew hatch outer pane (window #II) sustained an apparent
micrometeorite impact. The damage site measure I/4-inch in
diameter and was located at the 7' o'clock position of the
window, one inch from the edge tiles.
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FIGURE13.DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
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Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited typical hazing. Only a very
light haze was present on the other windows. Surface wipes were
taken from all windows for laboratory analysis. No other sites
on the Orbiter were identified for chemical analysis. A total
of 12 hits with eight larger than 1-inch in size were noted on
the perimeter tiles around windows #3 and #5. These hits may
have been caused by impacts from RTV used to bond paper covers
to the FRCS nozzles.
ET/ORB separation devices EO-I and EO-3 functioned properly
though the EO-2 debris plunger had not seated. No debris was
found on the runway beneath the ET/ORB umbilical cavities when
the ET doors were opened, but a loose wave spring was found
resting against a Hi-Lock fastener on the LH2 umbilical door.
The wave spring is part of the pyro separation device. All of
the umbilical separation ordnance retention shutters were
closed properly. No significant amounts of foam or red purge
seal adhered to the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical near the 4-inch
flapper valve.
Tile damage on the base heat shield was typical with the
majority of hits occurring in the areas between SSME #1/2 and
#1/3. Six TUFI tiles located on the triangular carrier panel
between and below SSME #2 and #3 sustained no damage. This was
the first flight of TUFI tiles. The Dome Mounted Heat Shield
(DMHS) closeout blankets on all three SSME's were in excellent
condition and no material was missing.
Three tile damage sites on the vertical stabilizer "stinger"
were attributed to contact with the Orbiter drag chute risers
during deployment.
Runway 22 had been swept/inspected by Air Force personnel prior
to landing and all potentially damaging debris was removed. The
post landing walkdown of Runway 22 was performed immediately
after landing. No Shuttle flight hardware was found on the
runway except for the previously mentioned landing gear tire
debris. All drag chute hardware was recovered and showed no
signs of abnormal operation. No organic (bird) debris was found
on the runway.
A Minolta/Land Cyclops infrared spot radiometer was used to
measure the surface temperatures of several areas on the
vehicle (per OMRSD V09AJ0.095). Twenty minutes after landing,
the Orbiter nosecap RCC was 284 degrees F. Twenty-two minutes
after landing, the RH wing leading edge RCC panel #9 was 127
degrees F and panel #17 was 137 degrees F (Figure 14).
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits
and the number of hits 1-inch or larger was less than average
when compared to previous missions (Figures 15-16). The type of
TPS damage is typical and not attribdtable to any single debris
source. Orbiter Post Launch Debris Anomalies are listed in
Section I0.
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FIGURE 14.STS-59 RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS AS
RECORDED BY THE SHU'rI'LE THERMAL IMAGER
TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS
RCC PANEL 17137
TIME 10:16 LOCAL
RCC PANEL 9 127
TIME 10:16 LOCAL
ORBITER:
MISSION:
OV-105
STS-_
ALL MEASUREMENTS IN
DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
NOSECAP. 284
TIME 10:14 LOCAL
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FIGURE 15 ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE
HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
S TS-6 15 80 36 120
STS-8 3 29 7 56
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58
STS-11 (41-B) 11 19 34 63
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36
STS-14 (41-D) 10 44 30 111
S TS- 17 (41-G) 25 69 36 154
STS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81
STS-27 (51-1) 21 96 33 141
STS-28 (51-J) 7 66 17 111
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 163
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193
S TS-29 18 100 23 132
S TS-28R 13 60 20 76
STS-34 17 51 18 53
STS-33R 21 107 21 118
STS-32R 13 111 15 120
STS-36 17 61 19 81
STS-31R 13 47 14 63
STS-41 13 64 16 76
STS-38 7 70 8 81
STS-35 15 I32 17 147
STS-37 7 91 10 113
S TS-39 14 217 16 238
S TS-40 23 153 25 197
STS-43 24 122 25 131
STS-48 14 100 25 182
STS-44 6 74 9 101
S TS-45 18 122 22 172
STS-49 6 55 11 114
S TS-50 28 141 45 184
S TS-46 11 186 22 236
STS-47 3 48 11 108
S TS-52 6 152 16 290
S TS-53 11 145 23 240
STS-54 14 80 14 131
S TS-56 18 94 36 156
STS-55 10 128 13 143
STS-57 10 75 12 106
STS-51 8 100 18 154
S TS-58 23 78 26 155
STS-61 7 59 13 120
STS-60 4 48 15 106
STS-62 7 36 16 97
AVERAGE 14,0 90.4 21,4 132.0
SIGMA 7.4 44.3 , 10.4 57.6
MISSIONS STS-23. 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 3OR, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCF
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OV-105 Endeavour landed on EAFB runway 22 on 20 April 1994
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Overall view of the Orbiter left side
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The Orbiter lower surface tiles sustained a total of 47 hits,
of which I0 had a major dimension of ]-inch or greater. Tl,e
largest tile damage sites were located on the lower surface of
the body flap and aft of the ET/ORB u_ilicals.
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A total of 16 hits, in two clusters oF_ 8 hits, occurred neaz.
the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. Hits around the ET/ORB umbilicals are
believed to be impacts from umbilical ice.
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The crew hatch outex pane (window #ii) sustained an apparent
micrometeorite impact. The damage site measured I/4-inch in
diameter and was located at the 7 o'clock position of the
window, one inch from the edge tiles.
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Forward-facing Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited typical
hazing. A very light haze was present on the other windows.
Twelve hits with 8 larger than l-inch in size were noted on the
perimeter tiles around windows #3 and #5.
75
OP!GT;",_AL PAGE
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH

Overall view of the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was
opened.
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. All three
umbilical separation ordnance devices functioned properly.
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The EO-2 plunger was not seated. No flight hardware was found
on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was opened,
but a loose wave spring from the pyro separation device was
found resting against a fastener on the ET door
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The EO-2 debris plunger was obstructed by ordnance debris
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A small amount of white RTV and ET foam, but no red purge seal,
adhered to the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical plate near the 4-inch line.
8O

9.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS
A total of eight samples were obtained from OV-105 Endeavour
during the STS-59 post landing debris assessment at Dryden
Flight Research Center, California. The samples consisted of 16
wipes (i IPA, 1 dry for each window) from Orbiter windows 1-8.
The samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC Microchemical
Analysis Branch (MAB) for material composition and comparison
to known STS materials. Debris analysis involves the placing
and the correlating of particles and residues with respect to
composition, thermal (mission) effects, and availability.
Debris sample results/analyses are listed by Orbiter location
in the following summaries.
9.1 ORBITER WINDOWS
Samples from the Orbiter windows indicated exposure to SRB BSM
exhaust (metallic particulate), landing site materials (earth
minerals), Orbiter Thermal Protection System (tile, tile repair
materials and glass insulation), paints and primer from various
sources. Building insulation fibers and carbon steel spheres
were also present. All of these materials have been previously
observed and occurred only in trace quantities. There was no
apparent vehicle damage related to these residuals.
9.2 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
The results of the organic analysis revealed an exposure to a
variety of materials. Identified component items included those
associated with window covers (plastic polymers), RTV from
Orbiter TPS and OMS/FRCS thruster nozzle cover adhesive, and
paint from various sources. All of these materials have been
noted in previous debris sample analyses and did not appear to
be associated with any vehicle damage.
9.3 NEW FINDINGS
This set of post-flight debris residual samples exhibited no
new findings. No debris sample trends are apparent when
compared to previous mission data (Figure 17).
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I0.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, ten post
launch anomalies, including three In-Flight Anomalies, were
observed on the STS-59 mission.
10.1 LAUNCH PAD/SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY
i. An ELSA box container detached from the OAA White Room wall
during launch spilling the individual ELSA units on the floor.
2. Post launch inspection revealed the G0X Vent Arm sustained
damage at the axial adjustment attach point. Several welds were
broken and the piston housing had collapsed. This damaged
caused the hood to be skewed or twisted approximately 1-2
inches from centerline. Some of the GOX vent arm damage was
attributed to improper welds (IFA STS-59-K-01).
10.2 EXTERNAL TANK
I. A divot, 8 inches in diameter, occurred in the LH2 tank
acreage just aft of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout
near the -Y bipod.
2. Six divots, ranging in size from 6 to I0 inches in
diameter, occurred in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout
in the +Y+Z quadrant (2 places outboard of the L02 feedline),
-Y+Z quadrant (3 places between the -Y bipod and the -Y thrust
panel), and on the outboard bondline of the -Y bipod spindle
housing closeout.
10.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
I. K5NA had separated from Hypalon-covered BTA and primer-
coated metal on the BSM support brackets (IFA STS-59-B-01).
Current surface preparation procedures are inadequate for
proper K5NA adhesion.
2. A debris impact site was noted on the IEA forward surface
TPS at 145 degrees radial location (IFA STS-59-I-02). The
impact cavity measured 2" x 1.5" x 1.75" The foam in the
damage site was crushed and shows signs that heating had
occurred inside the cavity - possibly during ascent.
3. Both frustums had a combined total of 46 MSA-2 debonds.
4. Significant amounts of BTA had been applied to closeouts on
the LH frustum, forward skirt, and aft skirt. Hypalon paint was
blistered/missing where the BTA had _een applied.
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10.4 ORBITER
I. During SSME ignition, surface coating material was lost
from base heat shield tiles outboard of SSME #3 (27 places), on
the base heat shield between SSME #i and #2 (3 places), near
SSME #2 (i place), on the RH ACPS pod aft surface (3 places),
and on the LH ACPS pod aft surface (i place).
2. The EO-2 debris plunger had not seated. No debris was
found on the runway beneath the ET/ORB umbilical cavities when
the ET doors were opened, but a loose wave spring was found
resting against a Hi-Lock fastener on the LH2 umbilical door.
The wave spring is part of the pyro separation device.
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1.0 STS-59 OV-105 Film/Video Screening and
Timing Summary
1.1 Screening Activities
1.1.1 Launch
Endeavour (OV-105) launched on mission STS-59 from pad A at 11:05:00.032
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) on April 9, 1994 (day 99) as seen on camera E-12.
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) separation occurred at 11:07:04.128 UTC as seen on camera
E-211.
On launch day, 24 videos were screened. Following launch day, 55 films were reviewed.
A post landing inspection of the Fixed Service Structure by KSC personnel identified
damage to the GOX vent arm. A review of the launch camera footage showed that both
the GOX vent arm and the Orbiter Access Arm oscillated during the launch. A
discussion of the analysis conducted may be found in Section 2.2.6, Damage to GOX
Vent Arm (Task #13) and Section 2.2.7, Orbiter Access Arm Motion. The damage to the
GOX vent arm during the launch of STS-59 has been declared an In-Flight Anomaly
(IFA# STS-59-K-01, Pad A GOX Vent Arm Damage during Launch).
Detailed test objective (DTO)-0312 (photography of the external tank after separation)
was performed this mission using the umbilical well cameras and a handheld Nikon
camera with a 300 mm lens and 2X extender. Thirty-six handheld frames of the External
Tank (ET) were acquired by the astronauts. The tank appeared to be in good condition on
the handheld film with the exception of four possible divots on the LH2 intertank
interface on the -Z side of the ET, a probable divot on the -Y axis of the ET at the LH2
intertank interface below the LSRB forward attach, and a divot on the LH2 tank aft of the
left leg of the forward bipod. Video of the external tank was downlinked by the
astronauts. All sides of the external tank were imaged. Several of the divots seen on the
films were also noted on the video views. Two rolls of umbilical well film were
received: the 35 nun film from the LO2 umbilical and a 16 mm film (5 mm lens) from
the LH2 umbilical. Several divots were noted on the umbilical well film including two
divots on the LH2 tank TPS and six divots on the LH2 intertank interface flange. Divots
in the ET TPS were noted on the aft LO2 feed line support bracket. Multiple erosion
marks were noted on the LH2 tank TPS in the -Y direction from the aft LO2 feed line and
support bracket. Numerous pieces of insulation and frozen hydrogen debris were seen
during the SRB and external tank separations. See Section 2.4.1, Onboard Handheld
Camera ET Analysis (Task #6) and Section 2.4.2, Umbilical Well Camera Analysis (Task
#5) for analysis.
1.1.2 On-Orbit
No on orbit anomalies were identified.
1.1.3 Landing
Endeavour landed on runway 22 at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB) on April 20, 1994.
Four videos of the Orbiter approach and landing were received. NASA Select TV, which
is a real-time composite of the other videos, was also received. Right main gear
touchdown was at 110:16:54:29.212 UTC and left main gear touchdown occurred at
110:16:54:29.346 UTC as seen on camera DTV-3. Nose wheel touchdown occurred at
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1.0 STS-59 OV-105 Film/Video Screening and
Timing Summary
110:16:54:45.310 UTC and wheel stop was at 110:16:55:22.848 UTC as seen on camera
DTV- 1.
Fifteen landing films were expected from DFRC. Thirteen films were received and
screened. Films E-1020 and E-1021 were not received. The importance of these films to
the drag chute analysis task was identified to Dryden personnel, who will rectify the
situation for future Dryden landings.
The following items were noted during the post-landing walk around: apparent damage
to the tread on the inboard tires of both main landing gears; TPS erosion on the forward
portion of the port OMS pod; and slight TPS erosion distributed across the base heat
shield.
1.2 Timing Activities
All launch videos had timing and film cameras E-I, E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-6, E-7, E-8, E-
9, E-10, E-11, E-12, E-13, E-14, E-15, E-16, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-25, E-26, E-52,
E-54, E-57, E-59, E-211, E-222, E-223 and E-224 had in-frame alphanumeric timing.
These videos and films were used to time specific mission events during the initial
screening. Film camera E-57 had in-frame alphanumeric timing, but the timing was
incorrect. Film from launch cameras E-62, E-205, E-207 and E-223 were used to time
events using encoded film edge timing marks (IRIG-B).
All landing videos had timing. Film from landing cameras E-1005 and E-1008 were used
to time events using encoded film edge timing marks (IRIG-B).
STS-59 Final Report 96
2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.1 DEBRIS
2.1.1 Debris during the Time of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
Ignition
2.1.1.1 LH2 and LO2 Tail Service Mast (TSM) T-0 Umbilical Disconnect
Debris
(Cameras E-5, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, OTV-49, OTV-50, OTV-5 !,
OTV-70, OTV-71)
Normal white (ice) debris was noted falling fronl the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical
disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff.
One piece of debris fell from the LO2 TSM disconnect area at T-1.6 seconds and struck
the SSME #3 bell near the rim at the 3 o'clock position. The debris then tell aft into the
SSME plume. No damage was detected to the vehicle. No follow-up action was
requested.
Figure 2.1.1.1 White Debris (Ice) from the I,O2 TSM Disconnect Area Strikes
SSME #3 Bell Rim at T-1.6 Seconds
(Camera E-19, Frame 3240)
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.1.1.2 LtI2 and LO2 ET/Orbiler Umbilical Debris
(Cameras E-4, E-5, E-6, E-15, E-16, E-18, E-19, E-25, E-26, E-31, E-34,
E-40, OTV-9, OTV-54, OTV-60, OTV-61, OTV-63)
Normal white (ice) debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical
disconnect areas and aft along the body flap at SSME ignition through liftoff. A large
piece of white debris broke away from the LH2 umbilical area and contacted the lower
edge of the LH2 umbilical door sill at T-2.3 seconds on the camera OTV-9 view. No
damage to the vehicle was detected. No follow-up action was requested.
Figure 2.1.1.2 White Debris from LH2 Umbilical Area Contacts the Lower
Edge of the LH2 Umbilical Door Sill at T-2.3 Seconds
(Camera OTV- 109)
2.1.1.3 Flash in SSME plume at SSME Ignition
(Cameras E-2, E-3, E-19)
Two orange flashes were noted in the SSME plume near the time of SSME ignition. A
flash was noted in the SSME #1 plume at T-2.2 seconds and in the SSME #3 plume at
T+0.9 seconds. No follow-up action was requested.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.1.2 Debris during the Time of SRB Ignition
2.1.2.1 SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7)
(Cameras E-7, E-9, E-10, E-13, E-14, E-16, E-26)
As on previous missions, several pieces of debris originated from the SRB flame duct
area after SRB ignition. No debris was noted during the screening process which
warranted velocity measurement. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.2.2 Flame Trench Debris at Liftoff
(Cameras E-57, E-63)
A single piece of white debris (possibly from the RSRB flame trench) traveled north at
liftoff on camera E-57. Numerous pieces of light colored debris moved westward from
the Rotating Service Structure (RSS) after liftoff from camera E-63. None of the debris
was seen to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.2.3 Debris near SRB Holddown Posts (HDP)
(Cameras E-7, E-8, E-9, E-10, E-11, E-12, E-13, E-14)
A dark piece of debris was seen near the LSRB holddown post M-8 on film camera E-14
just after Pyrotechnic Ignitiator Controller (PIC) firing. Several pieces of light colored
MLP debris were noted around all of the holddown posts. No ordnance or frangible nut
debris were seen near any of the holddown post DCS stud holes. No follow-up action
was requested.
2.1.3 Debris after Liftoff
2.1.3.1 Frost and Debris from the GOX Vent Louvers
(Camera E-79, OTV-61 )
Frost was noted on both GOX vent louvers on the ogive of the ET. Two small pieces of
frost fell from the port side vent louver at T-2.1 and T+0.8 seconds as seen on camera
OTV-61. The debris did not appear to strike the vehicle.
2.1.3.2 Debris along Body Flap after Liftoff
(Cameras E-41, E-52, E-57, E-59, E-65, E-211, E-224)
Several pieces of light colored debris fell along the body flap into the SRB plume after
liftoff through the roll maneuver. Most of the debris sightings were probably ice from the
ET/Orbiter umbilicals. One distinctly large piece of white debris was first seen near the
LH2 ET/Orbiter umbilicals and fell aft along the body flap into the SSME plume at 7.7
seconds MET on cameras E-52 and E-59. None of the debris objects were observed to
strike the vehicle.
2.1.3.3 Debris near ET during Roll Maneuver
(Cameras E-52, E-54, E-59, E-21 I, E-212, E-213, E-218, E-220, E-223,
E-224, KTV-4A)
Several small orange-colored pieces of debris fell from the region aft of the ET into the
SRB plumes during roll maneuver. This debris was probably umbilical purge barrier
material. No follow-up action was requested.
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2.1.3.4 Debris falling along SRB Plume during Ascent
(Cameras E-204, E-208, E-212, E-218, E-220, E-222, E-223, KTV-4A)
Numerous pieces of light colored debris fell aft along the SRB plume during ascent from
60 to 80 seconds MET. The same event was seen just before SRB separation. Similar
debris has been noted on previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
Figure 2.1.3.4 Light Colored Debris Falls Aft Along the SRB Plume During
Ascent from 60 to 80 Seconds MET
(Camera E-220, Frame 6486)
2.1.3.5 Debris Reported by the Crew (Task #10)
The following is a written transcript of the crew debris report provided by STS-59
Commander to the Mission Control Center Capcom on April 9, 1994.
Capcom:
Endeavour, Houston, for Sid and Chilton. We would like to get the
window debris report from you.
Endeavour - Sid Gutierrez:
Ok, Jay says to tell you we got camcorder of the ET and we did not note
significant debris. There were a few smudges on the front window screen,
but nothing out of the ordinary.
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Capcom:
Roger, we copy no significant debris other than a couple of smudges on
the front window screen.
Endeavour - Sid Gutierrez:
That is right. The typical stuff you see after a flight. I got about 3-4
splotches on my windshield, for example.
Capcom:
Roger, I copy that.
2.2 MLP EVENTS
2.2.1 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-burning Hydrogen)
(Cameras E-l, E-2, E-3, E-5, E-16, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-36, E-52,
E-57, E-63, E-76, E-77, E-222, OTV-70, OTV-71)
An orange vapor (possibly free-burning hydrogen) was seen beneath the SSME bells
prior to SSME ignition. The vapor appeared to extend forward of the aft edge of the left
OMS pod on the view available from camera E-77. No follow-up action was requested.
2.2.2 Flares in Hydrogen Burn Ignitor Nozzles
(Cameras E-l, E-3, E-20, E-30, E-57, E-77)
Flares were noted in the northwest and southwest hydrogen burn ignitor nozzles at SSME
ignition.
2.2.3 Variation in Order of SSME Mach Diamond Formation
(Cameras E-19, E-20, E-76, OTV-51)
The SSME Mach diamonds were noted to form in a different order compared to previous
mission films and videos. The order of formation was SSME #2 (at 11:04::56.841 UTC),
SSME #1 (at 11:04:56.903 UTC) and SSME #3 (at 11:04:56.910 UTC) as seen on
camera E-19. No follow-up action was requested.
2.2.4 Base Heat Shield TPS Erosion
(Cameras E-5, E-6, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20,. E-25)
Numerous occurrences of TPS erosion were noted on the base heat shield and both of the
RCS stingers after SSME startup. Erosion of the base heat shield TPS has been seen on
previous missions. No follow up action was requested.
2.2.5 Vapor from LH2 T-0 Umbilical Disconnect lines
(Camera E- 18)
A white vapor was noted coming from one of the LH2 lines between the LH2 TSM and
the I.M2 T-0 carrier plate. No follow-up action was requested.
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Figure 2.2.5 Vapor from the LH2 TSM Umbilical Lines Prior to Liftoff
(Camera E- 18, Frame 3910)
2.2.6 Damage to GOX Vent Arm (Task #13)
(Camera E-62)
KSC reported that damage occurred to the gaseous oxygen vent arm during the STS-59
liftoff. Films from STS-59, STS-38 and STS-60 were reviewed to determine the relative
motion of the GOX vent arm. This analysis was performed on the JSC 35-mm Film
Motion Analyzer (FMA). Movement of the GOX vent arm was determincd with respect
a fixed position on the Fixed Service Structure (FSS) to reduce camera and projector
motion noise. The positive Y direction was measured from the bottom to the top of the
field-of-view and are referenced in arbitrary image units. The motion from STS-60 could
not be distinguished from camera motion. Identical points on the FSS and the GOX vent
hood were used for both STS-59 and STS-38. On STS-38 motion was visible; however,
specific peaks were lower in magnitude than STS-59 and difficult to distinguish. The
STS-59 GOX vent arm frequency was determined to be 3.1 Hz and the STS-38 GOX
vent arm fiequency was determined to bc 3.2 Hz.
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2.2.7 Orbiter Access Arm Motion
(Camera E-62)
The Orbiter access arm was seen to oscillate after the vehicle had cleared the tower on
camera E-62. A white object on the floor of the "white room" traversed across the floor
during the oscillation. No follow-up action was requested.
2.3 ASCENT EVENTS
2.3.1 Body Flap Motion (Task #4)
(Cameras E-5, E-17, E-18, E-207, E-213, E-223)
Body flap motion was observed on views from three different ascent film cameras.
While the motion did not appear to be substantial in comparison to earlier missions, the
clarity of this event on E-207 warranted further analysis.
The time of apparent maximum deflection (between 32 and 35 seconds MET) was
visually chosen from camera E-207. The motion of the aft port and aft starboard edges
were plotted as a function of time. One of two control points on the fuselage was used as
a measure of the noise. Note that some of the apparent deflection exceeded the noise
component. A frequency domain analysis revealed identifiable modes of vibration.
STS-59 Body Flap Motion Measurements (relative to control point)
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Figure 2.3.1 Body Flap Motion Versus Time between 32.0 and 35.5 Seconds
MET
2.3.2 Flares in SSME plume
(Cameras E-211, E-212, E-220, E-223, E-224)
At least 6 flares were noted in the SSME plumes from 23.0 to 55.5 seconds MET. Flares
in the SSME plume after liftoff have been observed on previous missions. No follow-up
action was requested.
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A white flare (opposed to the typical orange flare) was noted in the SSME #1 plume
during ascent at 52.6 seconds MET on camera E-223.
Figure 2.3.2 White Flare in SRB plume at 52.6 seconds MET
(Camera E-223, Frame 6124)
2.3.3 Questionable Landing Gear Door Sensor Indication After Liftoff
(Task #I 1)
The MER reported that at approximately one minute after launch, near the point of
maximum aerodynamic pressure (max q), the left main gear (LMG) door uplock
proximity sensor indicated off (i.e., door not uplocked). Approximately 10 seconds later,
the sensor transferred back to on (i.e., door uplocked). No further problems were noted
with this sensor. The MER requested that the long range tracking videos be screened for
anything unusual at 60 to 70 seconds MET. No unusual events were noted during the
visual analysis other than debris sightings that are typically seen during this time period.
A listing of the debris sightings near the time of the questionable gear sensor reading was
forwarded to the MER on launch day. A similar event occurred for 12 seconds on STS-9
and was attributed to vibration at max q and the close tolerance on the rigging of the
proximity switch. The MER concluded that the questionable sensor indication was not an
issue based on the STS-9 data and no further visual analysis support was required.
STS-59 Final Report
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2.3.4 Linear Optical Effect
(Cameras E-204, E-207, E-208, ET-207, ET-208)
Linear optical effects were seen between 75.4 and 87.9 seconds MET, and again at
approximately 122 seconds MET (just prior to SRB separation). Linear optical effects
have been seen on previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
2.3.5 Loose Thermal Curtain Tape on RSRB during Ascent
(Camera E-207)
Loose thermal curtain tapes were noted on the RSRB aft skirt during ascent. No follow-
up action was requested.
2.3.6 Recirculation (Task #1)
(Cameras E-205, E-207, E-223, ET-207)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV prior to SRB separation
has been seen on nearly all previous missions. The sighting of this event is dependent upon
launch inclination angle and cloud cover during ascent. For STS-59, recirculation was observed
between 91 and 109 seconds MET on camera E-207.
Cameras on which recirculation was observed for STS-59
CAMERA START (seconds MET)
ET-207 94
E-205" 91
E-207 91
E-223 ---
STOP (seconds MET)
102
109
104
* BEST VIEW OF RECIRCULATION
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2.4 DTO 312 ANALYSIS
2.4.1 Onboard Handheld Camera ET Analysis (Task #6)
(STS-59-315-01 through 36 and L 1 Camcorder Video)
Thirty-six exposures from a 35 millimeter Nikon F4 camera were taken with Ektar 3101
film and a 300 millimeter lens coupled with a 2x multiplier. The photographs were taken
by Linda Godwin. The entire ET was photographed. No timing data was on the film.
The ET was approximately 1587 meters from the Orbiter at the time of the third
photograph.
o
35 mm Nikon Camera
(STS-59-315-012)
L1 Camcorder View
Figure 2.4.1a Handheld Views of -Z Axis of External Tank
Three of four (probable) divots noted on the LH2/intertank interface on the -Z side of the
ET are shown on the views above. Excellent quality video of the STS-62 external tank
after separation was down linked by the astronauts. A camcorder with a 2X extender and
a 10 to 1 zoom lens (100 to 10 mm focal length) was used to image the external tank.
The ET was tracked over nearly 7 minutes of video. Several of the divots seen on the
films were also noted on the video views. The average tumble rate of the external tank
was calculated to be 0.97 degrees/second from the video. This rotation is similar to
previous missions.
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Figure 2.4.1b Handheld Camera View of +Y Axis of External Tank
(Camera STS-59-315-003)
A probable divot was seen on the -Y axis of the ET at the LH2 tank/intertank interface
below the LSRB forward attach (1) and a divot was noted on the LH2 tank TPS aft of the
left leg of the forward bipod (2).
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2.4.2 Umbilical Well Camera Analysis (Task #_5)
2.4.2.1 16 mm Umbilical Well Camera Views of SRB and ET Separation
One high quality, well tocused 16 nun motion picture film was acquired from the Orbiter LH2
umbilical camera. The LSRB separation and the external tank separation appeared normal. The
16 mm umbilical film sequence of ET separation had variable exposure. Timing data was
present on the 16 mm film.
Figure 2.4.2.1a LSRB at Separation
(Frame STS-59-G-267-1077, Mag 1011 )
Numerous light colored pieces of debris (probably insulation) arc in view throughout the
SRB film sequence (1). Typical chipping and erosion of the side and base on the -Y
electric cable tray are visible (2). Erosion and scarring of the ET/Orbiter aft attach strut
are visible (3), A piece of TPS debris was seen to strike the horizontal section of the LH2
electric cable tray (frame 611). This debris did not appear to cause damage. A loose
piece of TPS was seen on the base of the electric cable tray (frame 694). A light colored
piece of TPS detached from the base of the LH2 electric cable tray prior to SRB
separation (frame 819). A piece of debris was seen aft of the LH2 electric cable tray that
appeared light colored on one side and dark on the other side ( flame 1292). This debris
appeared orange in color on some frames. The debris had a thin profile when viewed
from the side and may have been a piece of ablated top coat material.
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Figure 2.4.2.1b LH2 Umbilical After ET Separation
(Frame STS-59-G-267-5412)
An unidentified copper colored piece of debris drifted from right to left in flon/of the
electric monoball attach on the LH2 umbilical (1) (frames 5393 through 5618). This
debris may have been a piece of TPS. Frozen hydrogen is visible in the I.H2 17-inch line
connection (2). Blistering of the fire barrie, coating on the outboard side of the LH2
umbilical was apparent (3). A piece of frozen hydrogen debris struck the top of the
horizontal portion of the electric cable tray prior to ET separation (frame 3235). A small
piece of frozen hydrogen debris was seen striking the LH2 tank TPS prior to ET
separation (frame 4980). No visible damage to the ET was detected from the two debris
hits. A fast moving gray colored piece of debris was seen in f,ont of the LH2 electric
cable tray prior to ET separation (frame 4432). TPS erosion was noted across the base of
the LH2 tank forward of the cross beam (fl'ame 6369).
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2.4.2.2 35 mm Umbilical Well Camera Views of ET Separation
Sixty exposures of the external tank were taken with the 35 mm umbilical well camera.
The 35 mm film had good exposure and locus on the sunlit portions of the external tank
(the LO2 umbilical and the +Y side of the ET is in shadow). Timing data was not present
nor expected on the 35 mm fihn.
Figure 2.4.2.2a Divots Near LH2 Intertank Interface
(Camera STS-59-63-50)
Four white marks (divots) are visible on the LH2 intertank interface in the -Y direction
from the ET/Orbiter forward attach bipod ( 1 through 4). Two white marks (divots) are
visible on the LH2 tank/intertank close-out flange in the +Y direction to the right of the
LO2 feed line (5 and 6). Two white marks (divots) are visible on the LH2 tank acreage
(7 and 8). A dark shadowed area is visible at the center of mark # 7. This divot measured
six inches along its longest dimension. Approximately twenty-one small white erosion or
"pop corn" marks were seen on the intertank TPS in the vicinity of the forward
ET/Orbiter attach bipod (9). A piece of debris with a "clover leaf" shape is visible to the
right of the ET (10). This debris has a thick appearance when viewed from the side.
Small white debris objects are visible throughout the 35 mm umbilical film sequence.
Many of these white debris objects appear to be frozen hydrogen. Both jack pad close-
outs appeared intact ( 11 and 12).
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Figure 2.4.2.2b TPS Erosion and Voids on Aft ET
(Camera STS-59-63-10)
TPS erosion and voids are visible on the aft LO2 feed line bellows and support bracket
(1). Multiple TPS erosion marks and voids are visible on the LH2 tank TPS forward of
the cross beam (2). The red seal around the EO-3 fitting appears intact (3). The presence
of the LO2 lightning contact strips was not verified due to the shadow across the LO2
umbilical.
2.5 ON ORBIT EVENTS
2.5.1 Debris Seen After Payload Bay Door Opening (Task #12)
A D2 tape titled "STS-59 Downlink Earth Views" (JL5 reference number 606402) was
screened for debris after payload bay door opening (the duration of the tape is 2 minutes
and 10 seconds). Three prominent white pieces of debris were noted along with several
smaller pieces of white debris. The larger pieces of debris appeared to go from white to
dark as they tumbled out of view. The dark view could be the "thin" side of the object.
All of the debris appeared to originate aft of the vehicle rather than from the payload bay.
The debris could have been frozen oxygen which has been seen on previous missions.
Debris seen near the payload bay on previous missions include:
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STS-41 - Crescent shaped debris seen during Ulysses' deploy. This event was declared
an IFA.
STS-43 - Crescent shaped debris seen at TDRS deploy. The debris tumbled changing
from black to white. Engineers believed this debris was solidified oxygen which had
formed on the SSME bells during the oxygen dump just after MECO.
STS-54 - Numerous pieces of debris were seen on camera A after the TDRS deploy.
None of the debris appeared to originate within the payload bay. The debris was believed
to be ice from a water dump.
STS-56 - Debris was seen during the Spartan capture. The origin of debris was not
determined. The size of the debris was 2 x 3 inches with a velocity of 1.15 feet per
second.
The MER reported that they were no longer concerned about the STS-59 debris and that
no further analysis was required.
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2.6 LANDING EVENTS
2.6.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3)
2.6.1.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film
Camera E-1008 was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. Data was gathered
for approximately 1 second prior to landing from film with a frame rate of 100 frames per
second. Scale information was determined by using the main gear diameter (44 inches)
as a reference. A point on the runway immediately beneath the wheel was taken as
reference. The motion of each point was tracked for one full second. This height was
then regressed with respect to time, and the slope of the trend line was defined as the sink
rate. Measures of the sink rate were calculated over the full second prior to touchdown,
the last half second, and the last quarter second. Over these three intervals, the
corresponding main gear sink rates were determined to be 3.1 feet per second, 4.2 feet per
second and 4.0 feet per second.
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Figure 2.6.1.1a Main Gear Sink Rate Determination from Film
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The same scale reference was used in the calculation of the nose gear sink rate. Data was
gathered for approximately 1 second prior to touchdown from the E-1008 film. In
addition to the top and bottom of the main gear, an additional scale check was obtained
using the SSME bell diameters. These scaling factors appeared to agree closely with
each other. The bottom of the left nose wheel was tracked for a full second. This height
was then regressed with respect to time, and the slope of the trend line was defined as the
sink rate. Measures of the sink rate were calculated over the full second prior to
touchdown, the last half second, and the last quarter second. Over these three intervals,
the corresponding nose gear sink rates were determined to be 3.2 feet per second, 3.7 feet
per second and 3.9 feet per second.
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Figure 2.6.1.1b Nose Gear Sink Rate Determination from Film
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2.6.1.2 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video
Camera LRO was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. Data was gathered for
approximately 1 second prior to landing from the video (frame rate of 30 frames per
second.) Scale information was determined by using the rudder speed brake (201 inches)
as a reference. A point on the runway immediately beneath the wheel was taken as
reference. The motion of each point was tracked for one full second. This height was
then regressed with respect to time, and the slope of the trend line was defined as the sink
rate. Measures of the sink rate were calculated over the full second prior to touchdown,
the last half second, and the last quarter second. Over these three intervals, the
corresponding main gear sink rates were determined to be 3.8 feet per second, 4.7 feet per
second and 4.0 feet per second.
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Figure 2.6.1.2a Main Gear Sink Rate Determination from Video
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For the nose gear sink rate calculations, the main gear was used as a scale reference.
Data was gathered for approximately 1 second prior to touchdown from camera DTV-3.
The bottom of the left nose wheel was tracked for a full second. This height was then
regressed with respect to time, and the slope of the trend line was defined as the sink rate.
Measures of the sink rate were calculated over the full second prior to touchdown, the last
half second, and the last quarter second. Over these three intervals, the corresponding
nose gear sink rates were determined to be 3.5 feet per second, 3.9 feet per second and
4.0 feet per second.
STS-59 Nose Gear Sink Rate (Video Camera DTV-3)
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Figure 2.6.1.2b Nose Gear Sink Rate Determination from Video
Normally, sink rate is calculated from end-of-runway cameras which are thought to provide the
best results. While the nose gear sink rates calculated from film and video agreed closely, the
measured main gear sink rates differed between film and video by 0.7 feet per second. However,
upon close examination of the graphs, one can see that the slope varies similarly as a function of
ttme. The implication is that the scaling factor for one of the two sources may be off because of
viewing angle discrepancies.
2.6.2 Drag Chute Performance (Task #9)
(Cameras E-1005, El008)
The landing of Endeavour at the end of mission STS-59 marked the fourteenth
deployment of the Orbiter drag chute. All components of the drag chute appeared to
deploy as expected. Standard analysis of the drag chute angles as a function of time was
performed using the views from the film cameras E-1005 and E-1008. This analysis is
used to support the improvement of the aerodynamic math models currently in use. The
measurements from the side of runway cameras have an expected bias on the order of one
degree. The maximum measured horizontal chute deflection was approximately 6.9
degrees to the port side of the vehicle. Figure 2.6.2a presents the measured heading angle
versus time. Figure 2.6.2b presents the measured riser angle versus time.
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STS-59 Heading Angle versus Time
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Camera DTV-3 was used to determine the following drag chute event times.
EVENT
Drag chute initiation
Pilot chute inflation
Drag chute bag release
Drag chute inflation, reefed configuration
Drag chute inflation, disreefed configuration
Drag chute release
Coordinated Universal Time
110:16:54:41.458
110:16:54:42.325
110:16:54:43.059
110:16:54:44.027
110:16:54:47.597
110:16:55:11.788
2.7 OTHER NORMAL EVENTS
Other normal event observed include: ET twang, Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS)
vibration noted at SSME ignition, RCS paper debris after SSME ignition, ice and vapor
from the TSM T-0 umbilical disconnect areas at liftoff, right and left inboard and
outboard elevon motion visible after SSME ignition and at liftoff, ice and vapor from the
Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate (GUCP) during SSME startup and ET GH2 vent arm
retraction, debris in the exhaust cloud at the pad after liftoff, acoustic waves noted in the
SRB exhaust cloud, ET aft dome outgassing, vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after
liftoff, white flashes near the SRB plume, expansion waves, charring of the ET aft
dome during ascent, dark puffs in SRB exhaust prior to SRB separation, SRB plume
brightening, and slag debris in the SRB exhaust plume during and after SRB separation.
MLP events are: Fixed Service Structure (FSS) deluge water spray activation, Mobile
Launch Platform (MLP) water dump activation, and a water leak from an MLP J-pipe.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-59, the sixth
flight of the Orbiter Endeavour occurred on April 9, 1994, at
approximately 6:05 A.M. Central Standard Time from Launch Complex
39A (LC-39A), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Extensive
photographic and video coverage exists and has been evaluated to
determine proper operation of the ground and flight hardware.
Cameras (video and cine) providing this coverage are located on
the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch platform (MLP),
LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard the vehicle, and uprange and
downrange tracking sites.
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES:
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis
objectives for STS-59 included, but were not limited to the
following:
a. Overall facility and shuttle vehicle coverage for
anomaly detection
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems
c. Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB separation
time
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS)
integrity
e. Correct operation of the following:
.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Holddown post blast covers
SSME ignition
LH2 and L02 17" disconnects
GH2 umbilical
TSM carrier plate umbilicals
Free hydrogen ignitors
Vehicle clearances
GH2 vent line retraction and latch back
Vehicle motion
There was one special test objective for this mission:
i. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation.
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT:
Film was received from fifty-seven of fifty-seven requested
cameras as well as video from twenty-four of twenty-four
requested cameras. The following table illustrates the camera
data received at MSFC for STS-59.
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Camera data received at MSFC
for STS-59
MLP
FSS
Perimeter
Tracking
Onboard
16mm 35mm Video
22 0 3
7 0 3
3 3 6
0 16 11
4 2 1
Totals 36 21 24
rotal number of films and videos received 81
An individual motion picture camera assessment is provided
as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments of the
video products received at MSFC.
a. Ground Camera Coverage:
The FSS and MLP films of the STS-59 launch were generally
dark. This is due to the inability to change the exposure
settings after the scrub and due to the fact that the launch time
was moved up an hour earlier.
b. Onboard Camera Assessment:
Each SRB forward skirt contained a camera to record the
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly.
Neither camera recorded water impact. A 35mm hand-held camera
was used to record film for evaluating the ET TPS integrity after
ET separation. Thirty-six frames of the external tank were
recorded. Additionally a hand-held camcorder recorded the
external tank during the same time period and acquired
approximately 8 minutes of good quality video. A 16mm motion
picture camera and a 35mm still camera were flown in the
orbiter's umbilical well to record the SRB and ET separation
events. Both cameras operated properly.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
a. General Observations:
While viewing the film, several events were noted which
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and
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falling as the vehicle lifts off, debris north of MLP ejected
from SRB blast holes, debris induced streaks in the SSME plume,
ice falling from the 17 inch disconnects and umbilicals, and
debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent, which
consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detection paper and
purge barrier material. Body flap and inboard right elevon
motions were noted during ascent.
b. GOX Vent Arm/Beanie Cap Motion
It was reported after launch that the GOX vent arm/beanie
cap assembly was damaged during liftoff. Pad perimeter cameras
were reviewed and showed no evidence of damage. Motion of this
assembly was observed after the vehicle cleared the tower. This
observed motion seems to be more severe than that observed on
previous missions.
Measurements of the beanie cap motion were taken from
camera E-62 located southeast on the perimeter which provides a
near-normal view of the vent arm This view orientation is shown
in figure i. Table 1 provides a summary of measured peak-to-peak
and RMS values in both the cameras horizontal and vertical
planes. These data represent previous mission from Pad A. Table
2 provides a similar summary for missions which had similar wind
conditions at liftoff. None of these data are typical of the
STS-59 data. Figure 2 is a plot of the measured STS-59 data
compared to the STS-48 data. The STS-48 data are typical of the
previous missions that were measured. A large displacement is
noted on STS-59 at approximately T+8.0 seconds where the beanie
cap moved down and towards the FSS. This type of motion was not
observed on the previous missions.
An additional analysis was performed to determine the
vehicle position relative to the FSS during liftoff. Tracking
cameras E-220 and E-224 were used to plot the position of the ET
tip relative to the FSS. Figures 3 and 4 provide the plan views
for Cameras E-220 and E-224 respectively. Data were taken on
STS-59 and STS-48 which had the same trajectory and photographic
parameters. Data measured from each camera's horizontal and
vertical planes were fitted and interpolated to provide data
points at specific times(T+3.0 to T+6.0 seconds). These data
were then transformed to provide position data relative to the
MLP. Eastward motion (away from the FSS) is in the +Y direction
and northward motion is +Z direction. These data for STS-48 and
STS-59 are shown in figure 5. They show that the STS-48 vehicle
was tracking closer to the FSS than the STS-59 vehicle prior to
T+6 seconds. Data could not be obtained after this time since no
FSS reference was in the camera views after T+6 seconds.
125
Measured Beanie Cap Motion
Pad A missions screened
Mission
STS-42
STS-44
STS-45
STS-48
STS-50
STS-53
STS-55
STS-60
Observations
Slight movement
Slight movement
Moderate movement
Moderate movement
Vent arm obscured
Vent arm obscured
Moderate movement
Slight movement
Displacement P-P (in)
Horz Vert
5 111
Bad timing-Unable to read
7 10
Unable to read
Displacement RMS (in)
Horz Vert
I1 12
2 2
Unable to read
8 19 12 12
Unable to read
Table 1
Measured Beanie Cap Motion
Missions with similar winds
Mission
STS- 1
STS-41D
STS-51F
STS-30
STS-41
STS-57
STS-59
Pad
A
A
A
B
B
B
A
Wind Vel
6 knots
2 knots
9 knots
12 knots
24 knots
6 knots
16 knots
Direction Observations
Film unavailable120 degrees
106 degrees
101 degrees
106 degrees
90 degrees
91 degrees
101 degrees
Slight movement
Slight movement
Moderate movement
Slight movement
Slight movement
Severe movement
Displacement P-P (in) Displacement RMS (in)
Horz Vert Horz Vert
31 11
11 10
19 12
28 22
4
l
2
13 8
Table 2
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b. Foam Indentation on Right SRB
It was reported that the forward face of the right hand
ETA ring around the IEA area had suffered an indentation in the
foam. The indentation was 2.5 inches by 1.5 inches by 1.5
inches deep and showed signs of heating effect.
Five STS-59 films were reviewed that showed the aft IEA
box of the right SRB, or a possible debris source that would
impact the aft IEA box on the right SRB (E-25, 52, 62, 65, 207).
The aft IEA box of the right SRB was visible from SSME ignition
through most of the roll maneuver to approximately T+70 seconds.
No evidence of an impact nor a debris source was noted that
could have produced the indention in the ETA ring. Most of the
films had dark exposures because to the early morning launch. As
the vehicle ascended the image resolution further degraded to a
point that a particle of less than six inches could not be
detected.
c. ET TPS Divots
Several divots were noted on or near the LH2
tank/intertank scarf joint. Figure 6 shows these divots as
recorded by the 35mm umbilical well camera.
V. ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times are determined from cameras that view the SRB
holddown posts numbers M-l, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras
record the explosive bolt combustion products.
POST CAMERA POSITION TIME (UTC)
M-I E-9
M-2 E-8
M-5 E-12
M-6 E-13
99:11:05:00.029
99:11:05:00.030
99:11:05:00.029
99:11:05:00.029
b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined
to be approximately 30 inches. Figure 7 is a data plot showing
the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and
vertical directions. A positive horizontal displacement
represents motion in the -z direction. These data were derived
from video camera OTV-061. Film camera E-79 was not used to
measure ET tip deflection due to the low light levels at liftoff
which provided a degraded image.
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c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-59 was determined to be
99:11:07:04.15 UTC as recorded camera E-207.
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Figure i: View From Camera E-62
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Figure 6: ET TPS Divots
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Appendix C. Rockwell Photographic Analysis Summary
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ATTACHMENT I
IL NO.: 279-300-5518
5/18/94
ROCKWELL ENGINEERING PHOTOGRAPHIC
ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT FOR STS-59
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated to
determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video) providing this
coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39A Fixed Service Structure (FSS), Mobile
Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites, and uprange and downrange tracking
sites for the STS-59 launch conducted on April 9, 1994, at 4:05 a.m. PDT/GMT
099:11:05:00.020 from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and for the landing on April 20,
1994 at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB) at 9:54 a.m. PDT/GMT 110:16:54:30.
Rockwell received launch ftlms from 82 cameras (58 cine, 24 video) and landing films
from 11 cameras (5 cine, 6 video) to support the STS-59 photographic evaluation effort.
Overall, the films showed STS-59 to be a clean flight. Several pieces of ice from the
ET/Orbiter umbilical were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to the Orbiter
Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual condensation and water
vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB stiffener tings and dissipated after the
completion of the roll maneuver. Charting of the ET aft dome, recirculation and
brightening of the SRB plumes were normal. Booster Separation Motor (BSM) firing and
SRB separation also appeared to be normal.
Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge water was
activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were activated at approximately 1
second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal. All blast deflection shields closed
prior to direct SRB exhaust plume impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and
retracted as designed. The ET GH 2 vent line carder dropped normally and latched
securely with a slight rebound. No anomalies were identified with the ET/ORB LH 2
umbilical hydrogen dispersal system hardware.
Significant events that were observed or identified include the flares noted at the hydrogen
bum-off ignitors prior to SSME ignition, the GOX vent arm damage found during the
post-launch inspection of the FSS, and the apparent meteorite impact to the crew hatch
outer window. These events and other events noted by the Rockwell ftlm/video users
during the review and analysis of the STS-59 photographic items are summarized in the
following comments. These events are not considered to be a constraint to next flight.
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.
On Cameras E-l, E-3, E-20, E-30 and E-77, several flares (possibly excess
hydrogen) were noted at the hydrogen bum-off ignitor nozzles just prior to SSME
ignition (three on the northwest side and one on the southwest side). Flares have
been observed on previous flights and no follow-on work is scheduled.
,,
On cameras OTV-070, OTV-071, E-l, E-2, E-3, E-5, E-16, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-
20, E-76 and E-77, orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was noted to drift
from beneath the SSME bells upward to the left OMS pod just prior to ignition.
This vapor has been observed on previous flights and no follow-on work is
scheduled
. During the post-launch inspection of the FSS significant damage to the GOX vent
arm was reported by KSC. Review of the Pad perimeter cameras showed no
evidence of damage, however, at approximately 8 seconds MET (after tower clear
but prior to the vehicle roll maneuver) an up/down motion of the GOX vent ann and
twisting of the GOX vent hood was seen on camera E-62. Review of films from
selected previous mission (STS-60, STS-38, STS-37, STS-52, STS-35 and STS-29)
also showed the GOX vent arm oscillation. The video tape of the damage to the
GOX vent arm at the arm-to-hood assembly (broken stud, separated welds) and
films were reviewed by RI/DNY engineers. A copy of the video tape was provided
by RI/DNY to the JSC debris/photo analysis team for their review. This event will
most likely be classified as a KSC In-Flight Anomaly 0FA). KSC, MSFC and
RYDNY are currently working this issue to determine the cause of the damage.
. Post-launch pad debris inspection identified four MLP cameras with shattered lenses.
F'tlms from cameras E-2, EX2, EX3 and E-14 were reviewed from camera start/stop
to determine the cause of damage (debris impact, shock/pressure wave, etc.). No
indication of lens damage is visible on the ftlms and no further photographic support
has been requested.
.
On cameras E-19, E-20 and E-76 the SSME #2 Mach diamond formed prior to
SSME #3 compared to previous mission films and videos. No follow-up action is
planned.
. Two orange flashes were noted in the SSME plumes at SSME ignition (cameras E-
2, E-3 and E-19). One flash was seen in the SSME #1 plume and the other in the
SSME #3 plume. Flashes in the SSME plumes have been seen on previous missions.
No follow-up action is planned.
,
On cameras OTV-070, OTV-071, E-5, E-17, E-18, E-19 and E-20 normal ice debris
was seen falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical disconnect area at
SSME ignition through liftoff. One piece fell from the LO2 TSM disconnect area
and impacted the SSME #3 nozzle near the tim. No damage to the vehicle was
observed. No follow-up action is planned.
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On Cameras OTV-009, OTV-054, OTV-063, E-5, E-6, E-15, E°18, E-25, E-26 and
E-31, normal ice debris was seen falling from the LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical
disconnect area at SSME ignition through liftoff. Several pieces contacted the LH2
umbilical door sill, but no damage was detected. No follow-up action is planned.
Several pieces of light colored debris were seen falling along the body flap into the
SRB plume after liftoff through the roll maneuver on cameras E-52, E-59, E-211, E-
222 and E-224. This debris was probably ice from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals and
RCS paper covers. One large piece of white debris fell along the body flap into the
SSME plume. None of the debris appeared to impact the vehicle. No follow-up
action is planned.
On Cameras E-52, E-54, E-59, E-207, E-212, E-213, E-220, E-223 and E224,
several pieces of orange-colored debris fell aft of the vehicle into the SRB plumes
during the roll maneuver. This was probably umbilical purge barrier (baggie)
material. No follow-up action is planned.
Two pieces of loose thermal curtain tape were noted on the aft skirt of the right
SRB during ascent on camera E-207. Loose thermal curtain tape has been seen on
previous missions and no follow-up action required.
Several flares were observed on the SSME plumes during ascent (23 to 50 seconds
MET) on cameras E-205, E-211, E-212, E-220, E-223 and E-224. Hares have been
noted on previous missions. No follow-up action is planned.
The following events have been reported on previous missions and observed on
STS-59. These are not of major concern, but are documented here for information
only:
• Ice debris falling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area
• Debris (Insta-foam, water trough) in the holddown post area
and MLP
• Charring of the ET aft dome
• ET aft dome outgassing after liftoff
• RCS Paper debris
• Recirculation or expansion of burning gasses at the aft end of
the SLV prior to SRB separation
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME
start-up
• Twang motion
• Body flap motion during the maximum dynamic pressure
(MAX-Q) region which appeared to have an amplitude and
frequency similar to those of previous missions
• Linear optical distortion, possibly caused by shock waves or
ambient meteorological conditions near the vehicle, during
ascent
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15.
16.
• Slag in SRB plume after separation
• Vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after liftoff
• Fore-and aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the
centerline area between the SSME cluster at engine start-up
• Condensation on the Orbiter forward fuselage, ET nose and SRB
frustums during ascent.
• Elevon deflection for load relief was visible during ascent.
Camera E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent clearance
separation between the left SRB outer mold line and the failing ET umbilical
structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety.
A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances between the left
SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The films showed nominal
launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies were observed for the SRB
body trajectory.
Cameras E7-16-OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.020 requires an
analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during liftoff to verify nozzle to holddown post
drift clearance.
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No anomalies were
observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive clearances between the SRB
nozzles and the holddown posts were verified.
The landing of STS-59 occurred on Runway 22 at the Edwards Air Force Base.
Good video and film coverage were obtained. Main landing gear touchdown
occurred at 110:16:54:30 GMT and nose landing gear touchdown occurred at
110:16:54:45 GMT with wheel stop occurring at 110:16:55:23 GMT. Prior to
landing the crew reported that the egress hatch window had an impact crater in the
lower left quadrant. The post-landing inspection revealed that the crew hatch outer
window had sustained an apparent meteorite impact. The damage site measured
1/4" in diameter and is located in the left quadrant of the window. The window
glass will be removed and sent to JSC for analysis.
The post-landing inspection also identified damage to the inboard tires on both the
left-hand and right-hand main landing gear. No follow-up action is planned.
The flight marked the fifteenth use of the Orbiter drag chute. The drag parachute
system performed as expected. All sequenced events occurred as expected and no
hardware anomalies were observed.
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